INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma 1 was General Officer Commanding of the Konoe Division of the Japanese Imperial Army.
2 During the Japanese invasion of the Pacific region, Nishimura and his Imperial Guard Division troops had engaged in the Battle of Muar, in Malaya. 3 An Australian and Indian composite force, including members of the 2/29 th Battalion, 65 th Battery and 45 th Indian Brigade, had to withdraw towards Yong Peng en route held in the war crimes courts were clearly differentiated from field general courts-martial with respect to admissible evidence and maximum sentences.
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The Australian military authorities were vested with wide discretionary powers in regard to permissible forms of evidence. For the Australian authorities, the lowering of the evidentiary requirements assisted in expediting proceedings, given the difficulties in transporting witnesses to remote court locations around the Pacific region, and given also that in the post-War period witnesses may have died, or otherwise been unavailable to give oral testimony in court. 18 Part II of this article briefly outlines the background to the Nishimura trial. It then considers specific, and problematic, aspects of the trial that arose from the broad discretions exercised in the Australian war crimes courts. 19 In Part III, the impact of the relaxed evidentiary standards on the conduct of the trial is examined. Part IV discusses Nishimura's death sentence, and issues raised during the post-trial processes. Part V summarises residual questions concerning aspects of the Nishimura trial. The article concludes that, in the Nishimura trial, the threshold for admissibility of evidence was too low and the maximum sentence of capital punishment too high. The examination of these factors arguably raises questions about the standard of justice reflected in Nishimura's trial.
II BACKGROUND TO THE NISHIMURA TRIAL

A The Charge
Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma was charged with 'committing a war crime that is to say murder in that [he] at Parit Sulong in Malaya on the 22 Jan 17 The late historian, David Sissons, who was a leading expert on the Australian war crimes trials, had previously written about criticisms that the War Crimes Act was 'discriminatory' against Japanese suspects in regard to the rules of evidence, death sentences and the confirmation process. See David Sissons, The Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations (1942-1951) , University of California, 19 <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ changmin/documents/Sissons%20Final%20War%20Crimes%20Text%2018-3-06.pdf>. 42 murdered a number of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War'.
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Nishimura was alleged to have ordered the execution of the captured prisoners of war. 21 Section 3 of the War Crimes Act provided two definitions of war crimes. Pursuant to section 3(a), a war crime was defined as a violation of the laws and usages of war. 22 The laws of war required that prisoners of war were to be treated humanely, and that a surrendered enemy soldier must not be arbitrarily executed. 23 Section 3(b) of the Act also provided a list of war crimes that were in the remit of the Board of Inquiry -comprising Sir William Webb, Justice Alan Mansfield and Judge Richard Kirby -appointed on 3 September 1945. 24 While item (ii) of the Board of Inquiry's list included 'murder and massacre, systemic terrorism', 25 the charge against Nishimura clearly fell within the scope of section 3(a) of the War Crimes Act.
Captain Nonaka Shoichi was alleged to have assisted in the commission of the murders by passing on the order for execution to the officer in charge of the prisoners of war, Lieutenant Fujita Seizaburo. 26 In an unfortunate turn of events, Fujita managed to abscond on 8 September 1949 while he was in the midst of being interrogated by members of the Australian War Crimes Section 20 NAA: A471, 81942 -Record of Military Court -Nishimura and Nonaka, Précis of Evidence (emphasis added). 21 Ibid. 22 War Crimes Act s 3(a). As for the 'laws and usages of war', the Australian edition of the Ibid. in Japan. 27 He subsequently eluded capture by the Japanese police, and was eventually removed from the charge sheet as the third-named accused.
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B
Nishimura's Defence
At trial, Nishimura maintained his innocence. He argued that he had not given any orders for the execution of the prisoners of war. Rather, he argued that the order he had given was 'shobun seyo', meaning 'dispose of', and was intended by him to mean that the prisoners of war were to be evacuated to the rear. 29 The accused gave evidence that if he had wanted the prisoners of war to be executed, he would have given the explicit order of 'shokei', meaning 'execute'. Nishimura submitted that his instructions were for the prisoners of war to be returned to the headquarters of General Yamashita, Commander of the 25 th Battalion and Nishimura's superior, 30 which was some distance away.
C The Court
Nishimura's trial was presided over by Brigadier Kenneth Townley, ordinarily a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. 31 The other court members were Lieutenant-Colonel N F Quinton, Major E J Gerling, Major H F Hayes and Major W E Clarke. 32 Court members were experienced in matters of military service but were not required to have legal qualifications. Ad hoc appointments of judges-advocate were sometimes made to advise court members on points of law but this was not a compulsory requirement. 33 In Nishimura's trial, no judge-advocate had been appointed. 34 The Court did not issue written reasons for its findings, as was the practice of the war crimes courts. The absence of written reasons has contributed to the proliferation of varying interpretations and constructions of aspects of the trial. who assisted the Japanese defence counsel in all the trials at Manus Island. The allocated defence lawyer was Nakayama Choji, a lawyer with qualifications from Tokyo University. 37 The Japanese interpreters allocated to the trial were Akio Honda, Michiomi Suwabe and a 'Mr Muramaru', alongside an Australian interpreter, Sergeant V Shaw.
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III THE IMPACT OF LOWER ADMISSIBILITY THRESHOLDS IN THE WAR CRIMES COURT
War crimes courts were designed with very low admissibility standards for evidence, compared to the courts-martial and domestic courts with criminal jurisdiction of the period. 39 Section 9(1) of the War Crimes Act provided:
At any hearing before a military court the court may take into consideration any oral statement or any document appearing on the face of it to be authentic, provided the statement or document appears to the court to be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, notwithstanding that the statement or document would not be admissible in evidence before a field general court martial.
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Regulation 11 of the War Crimes Regulations stated that it 'shall be the duty of the Court to judge the weight to be attached to any evidence given in pursuance of section 9(1) of the Act which would not otherwise be admissible'. 41 These evidentiary provisions enabled the war crimes courts to exercise an extremely broad discretion with regard to admissible evidence. The practical effect of section 9(1) and regulation 11 was that the prosecution 35 NAA: A471, 81942 -Transcript of Proceedings -Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 2. 36 The failure to call witnesses was problematic in this trial. In particular, questions arose as to the prosecution witnesses' identification of the accused, the inconsistencies in their testimony as to what Nishimura had said, and the fact that court members were not given the opportunity to evaluate the evidence and credibility of the witnesses in person.
A
Witness Ben Hackney
The main prosecution witness in the trial was Lieutenant Ben Charles Hackney, an Australian soldier in the 2/29 th Battalion who had survived the Parit Sulong massacre. 42 Hackney had been captured by the Japanese forces at Parit Sulong, and subjected to cruelty, torture and inhumane treatment. 43 He only survived the massacre by pretending to be dead. His first-hand account of the massacre thus formed a crucial element of the prosecution's case. Despite the potential force of his evidence, Hackney was not called as a witness at the trial. Instead, the prosecution principally relied upon his sworn affidavit.
Of the events leading up to the Parit Sulong massacre, Hackney stated in his affidavit that:
One of these new arrivals was outstanding and presumably the Commander of the Japanese Forces in the area -a short, stocky fellow ... He looked at the officer prisoners, who were made to move off the steps and stand ... Upon leaving the building he spoke to one of the officers accompanying him who in turn passed on what were apparently orders to the Jap [sic] in charge of the prisoners ... About sunset the guards began to move around the house. Machine guns were brought from where they had been resting between tours of duty and placed in front of the building. 44 The prosecution used this evidence during the trial to suggest that the commander referred to was Nishimura. In August 1946, the 1 Australian War Crimes Section (based in Singapore) forwarded four photographs of Nishimura to Army Headquarters in Melbourne, requesting that they be 42 NAA: A471, 81942 -Transcript of Proceedings, Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 4-6. 43 NAA: A471, 81942 -Affidavit of Ben Charles Hackney, 12 November 1945. 44 Ibid. produced to Hackney for identification purposes. 45 Hackney was unable to positively identify Nishimura as the senior Japanese officer he had seen at Parit Sulong, 46 and had referred to and described in his affidavit.
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Nishimura's prison file noted that he was five feet and five inches tall (about 1.65 metres), and weighed 147 pounds (about 66 kilograms)
. 48 Yet, in his affidavit, Hackney had referred to a Japanese officer who was 'short' and 'stocky'. 49 In this trial, Hackney's identification evidence was pivotal to the prosecution's case. The fact that it appears that the key prosecution witness was unable to positively identify Nishimura, and that there was no opportunity for the defence to cross-examine Hackney or for this information to be presented before the court, gives rise to concerns about this aspect of the trial.
On the other hand, Nishimura had not denied that he had been present at the scene of the Parit Sulong massacre at the relevant time. Under crossexamination, Nishimura conceded that he had inspected the prisoners of war.
50 Nishimura's main line of defence was that his instructions had been incorrectly interpreted, and that he had not intended for the prisoners of war to be executed. However, while Hackney's affidavit identified one 'outstanding' presumed commander, it also referred to other senior Japanese officers, as well as soldiers, also present at the scene. 51 53 Given Hackney's inability to positively identify Nishimura, and the presence of other senior Japanese officers, the trial proceedings failed to test the presumption that it must have been Nishimura who had given the order to execute.
B Witnesses Lieutenant Inagaki, Captain Hinokuma and Captain Sono
Hackney's affidavit was not the only evidence tendered by the prosecution. The statements of three Japanese Armed Forces Officers, Lieutenant Inagaki Tadahiro, Captain Hinokuma Fukashi and Captain Sono Yoko, were also relied upon by the prosecution in its case against Nishimura. The evidence of the three Japanese witnesses was crucial to the court's reconstruction of what Nishimura had said at the scene, as Hackney could not understand Japanese and could not attest to this aspect of the prosecution case.
The prosecution adduced evidence from the three Japanese witnesses through their written statements. Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono had given sworn statements in 1949 (the '1949 statements') to Captain James Gowing Godwin, an investigating officer in the 2 Australian War Crimes Section in Tokyo. 54 In these statements, the officers had attested that they had witnessed Nishimura giving to Nonaka a verbal order for execution to pass to the officer in charge of the prisoners of war. The relevant portion of Inagaki's statement reads:
After Lieutenant-General Nishimura had stepped down off the porch and rejoined us other officers, he turned to Lieutenant Nonaka who was standing beside him and gave him, as far as I can now recall, the following oral order: 'Instruct the officer in charge of the prisoners of war' (rank and name was stated but I now cannot remember same) 'to execute all the prisoners of war by firing squad.' 55 The section in Hinokuma's statement reads: After Lieutenant-General Nishimura and others had stepped down from the porch and rejoined the other officers, he turned to his Personal Aide, Lieutenant Nonaka, and in the hearing of all the officers present, including myself, gave him, as far as I can now recall, the following oral order: 'Instruct the officer in charge of the prisoners of war' (rank and name was stated, but I now cannot remember same) 'to execute the prisoners of war in a suitable manner.' 56 Sono's statement was to similar effect:
Almost immediately after Lieutenant-General Nishimura and others had descended the steps and rejoined us other officers, he turned to his Personal Aide Lieutenant Nonaka Shoichi who was standing near him, and in the hearing of all those officers present, including myself, gave him, as far as I can now recall, the following oral order: 'Instruct the officer in charge of the prisoners of war' (rank and name was stated but I now cannot remember same) 'to execute all the prisoners of war by firing squad.'
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The 1949 statements contained similar passages, or slabs of evidence. On the one hand, the similarity of witness evidence may be proof that the accused did or said what the witnesses recalled. On the other hand, if witness evidence is remarkably similar, indeed almost identical, then the evidence may have been the result of coaching or coercion during interrogation. The impact of translation is another relevant factor, as it is also possible that during the translation process Australian investigating officers or translators may have used similar language to translate the respective statements. Upon later review of the evidence in 1950, Deputy Assistant Director of Legal Services at the Australian Military Forces Headquarters, Major Maxwell Ham, noted that sections of Hackney's evidence were mirrored in statements of other Japanese witnesses. 58 Ham stated that in his opinion 'the marked similarity does lend considerable weight to the allegations made that the words were largely put into their mouths' by Godwin. 59 In contrast to Ham's view, the subsequent opinion of the Judge-Advocate General, Supreme Court Justice William Ballantyne Simpson, was that the similarities across the witness statements resulted from Godwin using the standard interrogation procedures -in other words, Godwin would have unconsciously handled the matters using a methodology of chronological September 1950. 59 Ibid. ordering. 60 Silver too argues that Godwin used the standard process of interrogation, double translation, and arrangement into chronological order to produce the witness statements. 61 The end result was a statement compiled by the investigator, and translated for the witness before signing and swearing. 62 However, while the chronological ordering of statements addresses issues of form, it does not satisfactorily explain the content. The paraphrasing of statements by investigators, and the extent to which this was undertaken, does not adequately explain the high degree of consistency across the 1949 statements.
In an unusual set of circumstances, Nishimura's defence counsel also tendered statements that had subsequently been made by the same witnesses in 1950 (the '1950 statements'). These statements were tendered, peculiarly, in the trial's closing stages. While the witness statements reiterated that Nishimura had given a directive of sorts, the 1950 statements referred to an order to 'dispose of' the prisoners of war. 63 This evidence differed from the witnesses' 1949 statements and their reference to an order to 'execute'. The 1950 statements were inconsistent with the 1949 statements, and also raise concerns about the credibility of the three Japanese witnesses.
The evidence of the Japanese witnesses was extremely important to the outcome of the trial because, as Major Ham stated, 'the whole matter of Nishimura's guilt depends on what he intended the word "Shobun" to signify. If he did not intend the prisoners to be executed, then the executions were the result either of a mistake or of wilful disobedience'. 64 However, despite the 1949 and 1950 statements being inconsistent and arguably unreliable, the broad scope of section 9(1) of the War Crimes Act and regulation 11 of the War Crimes Regulations meant that the witnesses' sworn statements were unable to be closely examined in court. If these key witnesses had been called to give testimony at the trial, their evidence would have been subject to the rigours of cross-examination. 65 Nakayama's statement, while put forward in support of his clients' case, also highlights inherent problems with prosecuting trials on documentary evidence alone. Whereas this practice enables the expeditious conduct of trials, it also compounds the difficulties in the conduct of the defence cases for the accused. In this case, while the standard of proof remained 'beyond reasonable doubt', in practice, the lower admissibility thresholds effectively shifted the burden of proof onto defence teams. 66 As the prosecution could present cases on documentary evidence alone, the onus of proof then shifted to the defence lawyers and accused, who had to attempt to refute the admissibility, or disprove the authenticity, of the documentary evidence -in the absence of the oral testimony of witnesses. Japanese defence lawyers were already faced with language and cultural barriers, unfamiliarity with Australian military courts and common law principles, and comparatively short timeframes for preparation. Dickinson described the Japanese lawyers as being inexperienced and lacking in guile. 67 Moreover, the court's ability to ascertain and accord appropriate weight to evidence was affected by the absence of witnesses appearing in person to assist in this process. As witnesses were not called to testify during the trial, whether the evidence was genuine, conspiratorial, coerced or misinterpreted was not properly tested.
IV
NISHIMURA'S DEATH SENTENCE, PETITIONS AND THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
On 22 June 1950 the war crimes court found Nishimura guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging. 68 The evidentiary issues raised in Part III should be considered in the context of the court's sentencing range. It is argued that the lower admissibility thresholds combined with the option of capital punishment were inherently problematic in this trial. Pursuant to section 11(1) of the War Crimes Act, the court was empowered to impose death sentences on convicted war criminals. Section 11(1) provided:
A person found guilty by a military court of a war crime may be sentenced to and shall be liable to suffer death (either by hanging or by shooting) or imprisonment for life or for any less term; and, in addition or in substitution therefor, either confiscation of property or a fine of any amount, or both.
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This was a broad power that exceeded the powers of standard courts-martial as such courts could not sentence an Australian soldier to death except for specified offences arising from traitorous or mutinous conduct.
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There was no option of appealing Nishimura's death sentence to an independent judicial body as the war crimes courts were military courts, and military courts did not have an appellate mechanism. Under the War Crimes Act, the Governor-General's powers to confirm or order revision of findings, mitigate, commute or remit sentences, and defer executions, could be delegated. 71 In this particular case, these powers were delegated to AdjutantGeneral Major-General Warren Melville Anderson. The nature and scope of the war crimes delegations were distinguishable from those applicable at standard courts-martial as death sentences imposed on Australian soldiers could only be confirmed by the designated civil authority, the GovernorGeneral in Council. 72 After concerns were raised in 1945 by the Secretary of the Department of the Army, Frank Roy Sinclair, over the confirmation procedure, the Chifley Government decided that death sentences in war crimes cases were to be referred to the Judge-Advocate General -a civil authority with legal expertise -for advice prior to the Adjutant-General being able to confirm any sentences. 73 Nishimura's post-trial confirmation was exceptional as it deviated substantially from the normal process, as will be outlined below, and ultimately it was Cabinet that endorsed his death sentence. 
A The First Petitions
On 29 June 1950, Nishimura and Nakayama filed petitions against the finding and sentence (the 'first petitions'). Nishimura petitioned on various grounds: that the charge against him was false, the trial relied too heavily on documentary evidence, and he would never have given an order to execute by firing squad. 74 Nishimura submitted that during his 40 years in the Japanese Army he had never been taught to give such an order. 75 Nishimura also maintained that he should have been given more time in Japan to gather evidence for his defence, and that he had not had reasonable time to prepare, given that he had been held in custody in Singapore prior to being transported to Manus Island for trial. 76 He claimed that the first time he became aware of the charge against him was aboard a transit ship to Manus Island on 21 May 1950. 77 Despite this, at the commencement of the trial, when the court asked whether defence counsel wished to apply to adjourn the matter on grounds including the ground that insufficient time had been given for defence preparation, Nakayama replied in the negative.
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Judge-Advocate General Simpson, who subsequently considered the first petitions, agreed with the court's findings. 79 He concluded that 'from the written evidence tendered by the prosecution it will be seen that there was ample evidence to justify a conviction if the court saw fit to accept such evidence as accurate'. 80 
B The Second Petition
After the finding and sentence were confirmed, on 18 August 1950, Nakayama filed a second Notice of Petition (the 'second petition') requesting a new trial on the grounds of fresh evidence. 82 Nakayama argued that there had been a miscarriage of justice, and sought to have his client's Warrant for Execution postponed. 83 He referred to new statements obtained from the three Japanese witnesses, Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono (the 'new statements'). It was alleged that their original evidence had been obtained by 'leading questions, intimidation and suggestion, and was distorted by the investigating officers, and raise[d] a serious doubt concerning the truth and probative value of the testimony contained in the original affidavits'. 84 The new statements, which had been made after the 1949 and 1950 statements, were used in support of the defence's submission that the evidence was unreliable. 85 As outlined in Part III of this article, on 8 September 1950, Major Ham examined the second petition. Ham referred to the Judge-Advocate General's earlier review of the first petitions when he noted that there was 'no substantial miscarriage of justice so far as the proceedings themselves are concerned'. 86 The key issue, Ham noted, was the effect of the subsequent material forwarded in support of the second petition -namely, the new statements from the three witnesses. Ham underscored the similarities across the witness statements, and noted in particular that sections of Hackney's affidavit were 'closely reflected' in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses. 87 Upon examination of the similarities in the 1949 statements, he noted two possibilities: either that Godwin, 'being thoroughly conversant with what Lieut Hackney had said more or less put the words into the mouths of the three Japanese', or that the facts had an indelible impact on the witnesses.
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Major Ham acknowledged the 'tendency' for accused to make accusations of improper conduct against interrogators during the war crimes trials. But, given the 'marked similarity' across the 1949 statements, Nishimura's denials of guilt, and the weight placed on the evidence of the Japanese witnesses in the prosecution's case against him, Ham concluded that there existed a 'reasonable doubt that there may have been a miscarriage of justice and as the life of a man depends on the matter being correctly evaluated I think that such action should now be taken'. 89 The case was re-submitted to the JudgeAdvocate General.
Subsequently, Judge-Advocate General Simpson advised that the differences in the statements, and Godwin's use of chronological ordering, were sufficient reasons to find that the 1949 statements were valid. 90 In Simpson's opinion, the new statements did not constitute fresh evidence given that they could have been obtained during the trial, and that no miscarriage of justice had occurred. 91 He advised that there were no grounds for a new trial.
In an exceptional set of circumstances, Adjutant-General Anderson referred the case on to the Solicitor-General, Professor Kenneth Bailey, for his opinion in October 1950. 92 Like Ham, Bailey concluded that there were issues that warranted the re-examination of the Nishimura trial. Comparing the 1949 statements with the subsequent statements, Bailey noted that the 'general effect of the new statements is that the original statements were not voluntary as the law understands the term, and if believed they do seem to throw doubt on the evidence as to what orders were given'. 93 In his view the allegations made by the three witnesses and Nonaka as to the interrogatory methods used by Godwin, in conjunction with the marked similarities across the statements, raised questions about the voluntariness of the 1949 statements. As for the trial being presented on documentary evidence alone, Bailey thought that 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. the method of trial precluded certain advantages normally vouchsafed to the accused, and this consideration invites special caution in accepting any conclusion upon which doubt may be thrown, particularly in a case where the sentence is death.
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The Solicitor-General concluded that there was scope in the War Crimes Regulations to conduct further investigation. 95 Regulation 20, for example, gave the court an overarching discretion to adopt a course 'as appears best calculated to do justice'. 96 While correspondence indicates that the SolicitorGeneral had not responded to Adjutant-General Anderson as of February 1951, 97 and his written report was not formally submitted, the two men had discussed the matter.
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The defence filing of Nishimura's second petition in August 1950 exceeded the 14 day time limit after the court's findings. Pursuant to the March 1951 recommendations of the Attorney-General, John Spicer, the case was treated as an application for remission pursuant to regulation 19 of the War Crimes Regulations, and referred back to Presiding Judge Townley. 99 Judge Townley subsequently advised that there was no reason to remit the case because if the evidence had been presented at trial it would not have resulted in the variation of Nishimura's sentence. 100 Two of the original court members, LieutenantColonel Quinton and Major Gerling, were in agreement with Townley; Majors Hayes and Clarke were unavailable for consultation. 101 On 4 May 1951, Judge-Advocate General Simpson advised Adjutant-General Anderson that the finding and sentence should again be confirmed.
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C Petitions Submitted to Cabinet
In another atypical turn of events, Cabinet became involved in the case. 103 Nishimura, as he was awaiting the death sentence at Manus Island, was included in the group that was the subject of Asai's petition. 104 A submission regarding the petitions was then referred to Cabinet by the Australian Military Forces. 105 The Menzies government publicly announced its decision to endorse the death sentences of Nishimura and three other convicted war criminals by way of a press statement dated 30 May 1951.
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The high-level political involvement in confirming these death sentences was an extremely rare occurrence that was confined to the Manus Island proceedings, and was largely prompted by the involvement of the aforementioned external petitioners. Nishimura was executed at Manus Island on 11 June 1951, 107 and buried at sea.
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V RESIDUAL QUESTIONS
As outlined in this article, there are aspects of the trial that trouble this author and others. One problem is that Lieutenant Fujita managed to abscond midway through interrogation, resulting in the absence of the third co-accused from the trial. 109 His unsworn statement that Nishimura's order was for execution appeared to conflict with the evidence of Nishimura and Nonaka, and Fujita's evidence may have therefore been pivotal. 110 At various points it was implied that Fujita may have made a mistake in interpreting the order, 111 but given the dropping of charges against him and his absence from the courtroom such allegations could not hold much weight.
The Australian Military Forces correspondence indicating that Hackney was unable to positively identify Nishimura is another troubling factor. There may be reasonable explanations for this, but it should be highlighted as an anomaly at the very least. Hackney had been severely wounded and ill-treated during the massacre, and witnesses are not always able to recollect every moment of an incident or particulars of every individual involved. But given the vividness and level of detail of Hackney's account, and given that his evidence was pivotal to the prosecution's case, the fact that he was later unable to positively identify Nishimura naturally stands out. Furthermore, the prosecution of the case on documentary evidence meant that the defence could not cross-examine Hackney on the contents of his affidavit.
The degree of consistency across the three witness statements, and the allegations made by various Japanese officers, also raise questions about the voluntariness of evidence. If the defence counsel had requested that Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono be called as witnesses -it would certainly have assisted in clarifying key evidence. However, it appears doubtful that the request would have been granted given the amount of extra time and resources required, and because their appearance as witnesses was technically not required under the War Crimes Act.
During the trial, Nakayama did not seek to call any witnesses on behalf of Nishimura or Nonaka. 112 Given that the life of a prisoner was at stake, it seems extraordinary that Nakayama did not even attempt to call witnesses. 113 Also, the allegations raised by Nonaka in regard to Godwin's interrogation methods could have been raised with the three Japanese witnesses for inclusion in their additional statements tendered at trial. (It was evident that Godwin had interrogated Nonaka, Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono.) Furthermore, the subsequent petitions submitted on behalf of Nishimura were, after the initial unsuccessful petition, technically out of time. As previously noted, the Japanese defence teams faced numerous difficulties in the preparation of their cases, but in many respects Nakayama's defence work could be criticised for lacking the requisite forcefulness required in those circumstances.
Another issue arises from the fact that, although the conduct of the trial was independently examined by Major Ham and Professor Bailey, who both concluded that Nishimura's case warranted re-examination, this did not occur. Professor Bailey, as Solicitor-General, was an academic and one of Australia's most senior legal officers. On the other hand, Brigadier Townley and Judge-Advocate General Simpson were both Supreme Court judges and also had the benefit of experience in the sphere of military justice. However, both Professor Bailey and Major Ham raised concerns about aspects of the Nishimura trial. Given Professor Bailey's legal standing, and Major Ham's military and legal background as Assistant Director of Legal Services, their opinions should also have carried weight.
In this author's opinion, these issues raise doubts as to whether the outcome of the trial can be regarded as wholly conclusive. The discrepancies and ambiguities, if considered in their entirety, raise doubts, and such doubts are significant when the guilt of an accused sentenced to death on a charge of murder is in question. The war crimes legislation incorporated a catch-all provision in regulation 20 that enabled the court to adopt any necessary measures in the dispensation of justice, which in this case, should have been used to conduct further investigations.
It is, however, certainly arguable that Nishimura had some degree of culpability. The fact that Nishimura had been present at the scene is not disputed. Nishimura was General Officer Commanding and therefore responsible for the command of subordinates of various rankings. Putting aside the debates about the actual order given and the intention behind the order, Nishimura himself admitted that he gave the order of 'shobun seyo'. The Japanese military code, and strict adherence to orders given by superiors on behalf of the Emperor, 114 placed the utmost responsibility on commanders for the conduct of their subordinates. At the trial's close, Nishimura told the court, 'I am very sorry that due to my carelessness in this case such an incident as this happened. I wish to give praise with sorrow to those who were killed in this case. That is all'. 115 In this closing statement he admitted to his own 'carelessness' in the matter. The fact that Nishimura had failed to exercise proper supervision of his subordinates was also conceded by Nakayama in a subsequent petition. 116 The prosecuting counsel's closing address referred to the failure of Nishimura to either conduct a subsequent enquiry or to punish his subordinates for the executions. 117 The prosecuting counsel's references to Nishimura's failures correlate with certain elements of the doctrine of command responsibility. 118 At the time of the post-World War II trials, the legal concept of command responsibility was evolving in international law and it was applied in cases involving other senior Japanese officers in the Australian war crimes courts. 119 An Australian Military Forces file note dated 1949 referred to inadequate evidence for a direct charge of participation but highlighted Nishimura's exposure to a charge of command responsibility. 120 In contrast, notes drafted in 1945 after General Yamashita's interrogation, indicated that a case could be made out against Nishimura for ordering the executions.
121 Ultimately, the case was prosecuted on the ground that Nishimura had ordered that the prisoners of war be executed. However, as outlined in this article, problems arose in the construction of evidence regarding Nishimura's relevant orders. In practical terms, it may have been difficult for the Australian Military Forces to have prosecuted a charge of command responsibility given the inability of authorities to locate Fujita, and the deaths of Imai, Morioka and Toda. Possibly another consideration for why command responsibility was not used in the Nishimura trial was that the massacre was confined to Parit Sulong and not dispersed over a wide geographical area, or that the Australian authorities considered their case against Nishimura for ordering the executions as clear-cut. Theoretically, command responsibility was a plausible form of criminal liability that could have been used in the charge/s against Nishimura, and one that was supported by the undisputed facts of the matter.
VI CONCLUSION
The various problems in the trial of Lieutenant-General Nishimura arose from the extremely broad discretion granted to the court to permit evidence to be adduced before it, and from the application of the death sentence. Section 9(1) of the War Crimes Act effectively allowed cases to be prosecuted entirely on documentary evidence. In practice, this meant that key witnesses in the Nishimura trial such as Lieutenant Hackney, Lieutenant Inagaki, Captain Hinokuma and Captain Sono were not required to give oral testimony in court. The ambiguities and inconsistencies arising in witness evidenceparticularly with regard to Hackney's inability to identify Nishimura and the three Japanese witnesses' conflicting evidence on what order Nishimura had given -were unable to be tested before the court.
In contrast to a standard court-martial, the Los Negros court was able to hand down death sentences for a wide range of war crimes. The legislative and regulatory frameworks governing the trial of war crimes, like those governing military courts but unlike those governing domestic courts vested with criminal jurisdiction, did not include an independent appeals channel. Furthermore, the war crimes court differed from a standard court-martial in that the authority vested with the power to confirm death sentences was, in this particular case, the Adjutant-General. In Nishimura's case, the petitions were considered by Adjutant-General Anderson and Judge-Advocate General Simpson. The unusual circumstances in this case included the referral of the matter to Solicitor-General Bailey, and, formally, to Cabinet for final approval. (The involvement of the external petitioners warranted the highlevel political involvement.) There was majority consensus that the findings should be confirmed, but the two contrasting opinions given by Major Ham and Professor Bailey are indicative of the problematic aspects of the trial.
The war crimes legislation enabled the trials of Japanese accused in military courts, with the overarching purpose being the implementation of postconflict justice for war crimes committed against Australian, Allied and associated forces during World War II. The war crimes courts, under the legislation, exercised broad discretion in regard to the admissibility of evidence and the choice of sentence. This enabled the expeditious conduct of proceedings. These objectives were precariously balanced, at times, against the need to ensure justice for the accused and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This precarious balance can be seen in the Nishimura trial. Questions about the degree of justice achieved by this case are raised by a combination of, first, the prosecution of the case wholly on documentary evidence; second, the application of low admissibility thresholds; third, the questionable voluntariness and reliability of witness evidence; and, last, the fact that the death penalty was imposed.
It is acknowledged that the trial was conducted at a time and in a type of forum far removed from contemporary fair trial principles. It is true that the Australian authorities ensured that Nishimura was assisted by defence counsel, that adjournments might have been permitted if his counsel had made such requests to the court, and that numerous petitions by the accused over a one year period were considered. But in a method of trial where the floor for admissible evidence is set too low, and the ceiling of capital punishment placed too high, there is more opportunity for problems to arise in the pursuit of justice. Whilst more than 60 years have passed since this trial commenced, it is arguable that certain aspects of the Nishimura case remain open to debate to this very day.
